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A B S T R A C T
The ﬁve Nordic countries have aggressive climate and energy policies in place and have already emerged to be
leaders in renewable energy and energy eﬃciency. Denmark is renowned for its pioneering use of wind energy,
Finland and Sweden bioenergy, Norway hydroelectricity and Iceland geothermal energy. All countries aim to be
virtually “fossil free” by 2050. This study explores the Nordic energy transition through the lens of three
interconnected research questions: How are they doing it? What challenges exist? And what broader lessons
result for energy policy? The study ﬁrstly investigates the pathways necessary for these ﬁve countries to achieve
their low-carbon goals. It argues that a concerted eﬀort must be made to (1) promote decentralized and
renewable forms of electricity supply; (2) shift to more sustainable forms of transport; (3) further improve the
energy eﬃciency of residential and commercial buildings; and (4) adopt carbon capture and storage
technologies for industry. However, the section that follows emphasizes some of the empirical barriers the
Nordic transition must confront, namely political contestation, technological contingency, and social justice and
recognition concerns. The study concludes with implications for what such historical progress, and future
transition pathways, mean for both energy researchers and energy planners.
1. Introduction
This article explores the history and dynamics of the Nordic low-
carbon energy transition. The Nordic region oﬀers a paradigmatic
example in the real world where communities, companies, and
countries have taken concrete eﬀorts to successfully reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy security. It has long
been promoted within the academic literature as a blueprint for
technological innovation and renewable energy deployment (Sovacool
et al., 2008; Borup et al., 2008; Sovacool, 2013) as well as the
underlying politics and institutional dynamics behind its energy and
climate policies (Westholm and Lindahl, 2012; Nilsson et al., 2011)
and its promotion of electricity trade and interconnection (Unger and
Ekvall, 2003).
Today, the ﬁve countries that comprise the Nordic region—
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—have progressive
energy and climate policies that are perhaps the most ambitious in the
world. Each has a series of longstanding policy goals; each has binding
climate targets; each are attempting to become entirely or mostly
“fossil fuel free” or “carbon neutral,” with Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway committed to 100% renewable energy penetration, Finland
80%, and Iceland 50–75%. Indeed, as the International Energy Agency
and Nordic Energy Research (2016) recently noted, electricity genera-
tion across the Nordic region is already 87% “carbon-free” and the
regional economy has “exhibited a steady decoupling of GDP from
energy-related CO2 emissions and declining CO2 intensity in energy
supply for decades.”
This study explores the Nordic energy transition through the lens of
three interconnected research questions: How are they doing it? What
challenges exist? And what broader lessons emerge for energy policy?
In answering them, the study aims to make three contributions. First,
the Nordic experience may indeed oﬀer lessons or a roadmap that other
countries can follow. Important factors critical to successful Nordic
decarbonization so far include an emphasis on industrial energy
eﬃciency; a shift from fossil fuels to low-carbon forms of heating;
expansion of distributed and renewable sources of electricity; and,
perhaps most critically, a stable and supportive policy environment
involving ambitious carbon taxes and strong incentives coupled with
the almost complete displacement of fossil fuel and a moderation of
nuclear power (which may not be going away so quickly). Contrary to
much conventional wisdom, the Nordic energy transition illustrates
that an energy system potentially based on distributed resources,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.045
Received 4 October 2016; Received in revised form 22 December 2016; Accepted 23 December 2016
⁎ Correspondence to: Business and Social Sciences and Center for Energy Technologies, Aarhus University, Birk Centerpark 15, DK-7400 Herning, Denmark.
E-mail address: BenjaminSo@hih.au.dk.
Energy Policy 102 (2017) 569–582
0301-4215/ © 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
MARK
interconnected European grids, and ﬂexibility could be less costly, and
deliver greater value through co-beneﬁts, than one reliant entirely on
centralized, fossil-fueled sources of energy. These technology and
policy lessons could be worth exporting.
The second contribution of the article, however, is to emphasize the
contingency and sheer diﬃculty of low-carbon energy transitions. Even
if it all goes to plan—and it may not—the Nordic transition will still take
decades until 2050. The Nordic countries must address the need to
decarbonize transport as well as power and heat; build interconnectors
to incentivize new power capacity; and green both residential buildings
as well as large energy and carbon intensive industrial ﬁrms. The
Nordic region also involves a set of countries that are relatively small in
terms of geographic area and population, wealthy in terms of economic
development, and socially committed to environmental goals. The
Nordic countries sit on clean energy resources that could be exploited
beyond the population's needs but suﬀer from varying degrees of social
opposition in some circumstances. The region also remains a large net
exporter of oil and gas. The transition, therefore, is contested and
contingent, and it will create its own set of winners and losers. While
the topic of transitions has become more prominent in the energy
studies literature, most work has focused on other areas. Recent
dimensions explored include the temporal dynamics or speed at which
a transition can take place (Sovacool, 2016) as well as historical trends
(Grubler et al., 2016; Smil, 2016; Fouquet, 2016a, 2016b), politics and
governance (Kern and Rogge, 2016), and even cost and sectoral
dimensions (Sovacool and Geels, 2016). But none have yet looked at
how contingency, contestation, and justice can aﬀect decarbonization
pathways and create a series of obdurate challenges that can overcome
even the best of intentions.
A third and ﬁnal contribution is both future-orientated and
practical. Although it has certainly been ongoing for at least a few
decades now, the Nordic energy transition has not yet been completed.
Because the Nordic countries have climate and energy targets that span
into 2030, 2045, 2050 and beyond, they can still be inﬂuenced by
stakeholders. This study therefore hopes to both exert inﬂuence over
Nordic policy as well as temper the optimism inherent in the discourse
about the future Nordic energy transition. It does this by underscoring
the immensity of the task and raising the salience of perhaps neglected
concerns surrounding technology, politics, and social justice.
Ultimately, even if the Nordic region has perhaps the most progressive
policies, it must match these over the coming decades with consistent
empirical performance.
2. Research methods
The research design and primary data for this study draw heavily
from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research (2013)
as well as International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research
(2016). These two reports, both focused on energy and carbon
technology pathways in the Nordic region, rely on a broader methodol-
ogy employed in the International Energy Agency’s Energy Technology
Perspectives. This methodology involves a mix of back-casting and
forecasting over diﬀerent scenarios from the current time (2011 for the
ﬁrst report, 2013 for the second) to 2050. The approach attempts to
reveal, through optimization modeling, the most economical ways for
the Nordic societies to reach their desired outcome of being fossil-free
by 2050. The idea is that by synthesizing diﬀerent modeling approaches
that reﬂect in-depth insights spread across diﬀerent sectors, such as
electricity or transport, one can get robust and reliable results. The
section of the paper “How are they doing it” replicates the scenarios
presented by this model, drawn from a mix of publicly available data
connected to the two reports as well as enhanced and deepened
analysis gleaned from correspondence with two of the report’s authors,
Benjamin Donald Smith and Markus Wråke.
More speciﬁcally, the “Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives”
model, or NETP, allows for the integration of data from four sub-
models: energy conversion, industry, transport, and buildings (meant
to encompass residential and commercial entities). The NETP enables
one to explore outcomes and scenarios matched to variables in energy
supply (such as the intermittency of some renewable sources of
electricity) as well as the dynamics of demand across three sectors
(industry, transport, buildings) which are also the largest source of
Nordic greenhouse gas emissions. Fig. 1 displays the complex interac-
tion of these various elements and how the NETP treats processes that
convert primary energy to ﬁnal energy utilized across demand-side
sectors. As the IEA states, the NETP is a cost optimization-based model
designed to enable “a technology-rich, bottom-up analysis” of the
Nordic energy system.
While the NETP model is state-of-the-art and still used by the IEA,
a few shortcomings exist. As the IEA and Nordic Energy Research
(2016) acknowledge, “many subtleties cannot be captured in a cost
optimization framework: political preferences, feasible ramp-up rates,
capital constraints and public acceptance.” So, the model is best
considered a useful snapshot or tool, rather than a completely accurate
portrayal of reality. In other words, the long-term projections drawn
from the NETP contain substantial uncertainties, and many of the
assumptions underlying the analysis will change in the future, aﬀecting
its accuracy. Moreover, the NETP does not account for some of the
secondary costs from climate change, such as investments made in
adaptation and resilience. Lastly, although the NETP does account for
innovation, technological learning, and reductions in cost among many
energy systems, it relies heavily on the state of that technology (and its
respective markets) as of 2016. Put another way, the NETP does not
presume the appearance of sudden breakthrough technologies, nor
does it rely on systems that were not considered commercially available
as of 2016. That makes it well suited to study incremental changes, but
transformative shifts are harder to fully capture. That said, the NETP
does acknowledge Nordic energy and climate policies already imple-
Fig. 1. Structure of the Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives model.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research (2016), Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives 2016 (Paris: OECD, 2016). Notes: TIMES=The
Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System, MoMo=Mobility Model.
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mented or committed—unlike other forecasts from groups like the U.S.
Energy Information Administration which try to be “policy neutral”
(Gilbert and Sovacool, 2016). Additionally, the model does reﬂect the
complexity of integration, noting that as the Nordic region gets closer
to 2050, the energy system comes to rely on a more diﬀuse portfolio of
distributed technologies, which will typically depend on local condi-
tions in a country and therefore require greater eﬀorts of optimization.
The second half of the paper goes well beyond the analysis extracted
from the NETP reports to assess likely sociotechnical barriers (Geels,
2004) organized around the themes of contingency, contestation, and
energy justice. These themes, unique to this study, were compiled
inductively and qualitatively from a search of both the recent peer-
reviewed literature on the topic and insights from popular media and
press accounts (mostly articles from English language domestic news-
papers across the ﬁve Nordic countries) published from 2012 to 2016.
With its basic approach, methodology, and limitations laid out, the
rest of this study proceeds as follows. The section “How are they doing
it” focuses on an overview of Nordic energy conversion and use as well
as its four decarbonization pathways—renewables, eﬃciency, transport,
and industry. The section “What challenges exist” discusses possible
challenges that can complicate such pathways, namely technological
contingency as well as political contestation and energy justice.
3. How are they doing it?: Nordic decarbonization pathways
The ﬁve Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden are not uniform. Each of them continues to see diﬀerent
market features emerge. Denmark urgently needs new ways of increas-
ing the ﬂexibility of its energy system to accommodate the variability of
wind energy. Finland has an energy economy dominated by biomass
and forestry products, is a net importer, hosts heavy industry, and is
building new nuclear power units. Iceland has a huge ﬁshing ﬂeet
fueled by diesel and remote communities in the Faroe Islands and
Greenland depend on diesel generators. Norway remains heavily
invested in oil and domestic hydropower, but has trouble monetizing
its hydro resources due to a cheap surplus. Sweden remains (at the
moment) wedded to mostly large hydropower and nuclear sources of
supply and is pushing ahead with potentially regressive national green
certiﬁcates for renewables at odds to the cost-optimized approach
suggested by NETP which recommends a carbon tax or trading scheme.
All countries remain dominated by carbon-intensive modes of trans-
port and are in great need of low-carbon mobility infrastructure, and all
need carbon capture and storage at iron, steel, chemical, and cement
industrial facilities.
Nonetheless, as a region these ﬁve countries share some interesting
features. As Fig.2 indicates, despite longstanding climate goals, aggre-
gated energy supply (in petajoules, including oil and gas resources that
are exported) is still dominated by fossil fuels (3110 PJ), the bulk of
which are reﬁned for transport and other end-uses, followed by
renewables and waste (2002 PJ). A second notable feature is an almost
even split in demand, with industry (1610 PJ) slightly ahead of
residential and commercial buildings (1527 PJ) and transport
(1152 PJ), correcting the misnomer that the Nordic region no longer
has a strong manufacturing base. A ﬁnal illustrative trend is the
conversion and eﬃciency losses of 1500 PJ (or 24.8% of 6060 PJ in
total supply), implying that while eﬃcient compared to many other
regions of the world, there are still signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains to be
captured. Fig. 3 helps break down primary energy production by both
country—showing how Norway far surpasses other countries on an
aggregate basis—and fuel source—showing how natural gas and oil still
provide about three-quarters of regional energy supply.
As the rest of this section of the study indicates, the four pillars of
the Nordic energy transition involve renewable electricity and heat,
energy eﬃciency, transport, and industry.
3.1. Renewable electricity and heat
At present, about 87% of electricity generation in Nordic countries
is low-carbon, of which 63% comes entirely from renewable sources.
That said, there is still room for considerable expansion, especially
involving wind energy, biomass and waste, hydro, and geothermal.
Although wind energy already comprises a substantial role in
Denmark’s electricity portfolio, and it is expected to grow rapidly
between 2016 and 2050, even in Denmark biomass and waste provide
far more primary energy supply, although some of this heat is lost in
transformation and distribution. This trend of bioenergy and waste
dominating is the same with Finland (led by biomass and waste for all
renewables) and Sweden (biomass and waste followed by hydropower).
Norway is led almost entirely by hydropower; Iceland by geothermal, as
Fig. 4 illustrates.
The bottom panel of Fig. 4 also illustrates the likely shifts that need
to occur within the electricity sector if carbon targets are to be reached,
namely, a dramatic reduction in supply from more than 6000 PJ to
roughly 4500 PJ. Net electricity exports, bioenergy and waste, wind,
Fig. 2. Nordic Energy Flows by Sources, Pathways, and End-Use Sectors, 2013.Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy
Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016).
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geothermal, solar, and hydroelectricity all expand signiﬁcantly; coal,
oil, natural gas, and nuclear power shrink. Indeed, bioenergy comes to
surpass oil as the largest energy carrier, increasing to 1600 PJ, and also
helping account for 40% of all emissions reductions (by displacing oil).
Nordic hydropower expands, backed largely by the deployment of
larger-scale, reservoir based installations supplemented with some
“run of river” or microhydro units. Wind energy also rises to displace
fossil and nuclear electricity generation. In fact, wind energy produc-
tion increases so much—ﬁve-fold from 7% of Nordic generation to 30%
by 2050—that its generation comes to far exceed domestic demand,
even with the drop in nuclear power—this excess capacity starts to
serve a lucrative export market in Europe. Much (70%) of this wind
capacity is projected to occur in Denmark, and two-thirds of it is
expected to be onshore, demonstrating the necessity of proper siting
and public approval. Fig. 5 graphically depicts expected full load hours
(wind quality) for both onshore and oﬀshore conﬁgurations. The high
penetration of wind power comes to be balanced and integrated
through a mix of the aforementioned expansion of hydropower, ﬂexible
supply, demand response, some storage, and electricity trade.
Fig. 6 demonstrates that substantial shifts in the composition of
electricity generation are not the only ones needed; a concomitant
further decarbonization of district heat generation and heat supply
must occur. Oil, coal, and natural gas must be almost completely
phased out by 2040; biomass and waste, geothermal, and electric heat
must be ramped up. Heating networks transition not only from fossil
fuels but also to heat pumps and electric boilers, adding ﬂexibility to an
integrated power and heat system. Moreover, the NETP predicts that
by 2050, space heating will come to comprise more than half of total
building ﬁnal energy consumption.
3.2. Energy eﬃciency in buildings
As brieﬂy mentioned above, the expansion of low-carbon electricity
Fig. 3. Total Primary Energy Production in Nordic Countries, 1990–2011
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic
Energy Technology Perspectives (2013) (Paris: OECD, 2013). Note: EJ=Exajoules,
Fig. 4. Electricity generation and primary energy supply in the Nordic countries, 2013–2050.
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Fig. 5. Full load hours for onshore and oﬀshore wind, 2030–2049.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016).
Fig. 6. Nordic electricity generation and district heating supply, 2013–2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: both panels depict the
“Carbon Neutral Scenario.” TWh = Terrawatt-hours.
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and heat supply networks is only one of four transition pillars. Their
growth must be combined with substantive reductions in demand and
energy end use in buildings (and industry—discussed in a later section).
This challenge is all the more stark given that only Denmark—as Fig. 7
depicts—consumes less energy per capita than the average for countries
belonging to the OECD. Iceland, in particular, consumes many times
the OECD average and northern countries such as Finland and Norway
also consume much more. This is not only because of the harsher,
darker winters with higher heating and lighting needs; it is also aﬀected
by the fairly low population density outside of the major metropolitan
areas of Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, and Stockholm, and the growing
energy needs of industry.
Because of this comparatively high energy use per capita, energy
eﬃciency plays an instrumental role in Nordic decarbonization.
Although the Nordic region is already fairly well known for having
eﬃcient building stock, demand side management and energy eﬃ-
ciency programs, more gains are needed. A further 35% drop in
residential and commercial energy use per square meter must occur
between 2010 and 2050. This reﬂects a monumental investment
challenge, and most of it needs targeted in heat: of roughly $170
billion in additional cumulative buildings investments forecast under
the NETP compared to the baseline scenario, $155 billion must go to
building envelopes and dramatically reducing space heating demand.
These investments in both energy eﬃciency eﬀorts (especially
building envelopes) and more eﬃcient heat networks are expected to
see buildings energy consumption notably decline from 2013 to 2050.
As Fig. 8 indicates, total energy consumption in residential and
commercial buildings must drop from almost 1400 PJ to 1000 PJ,
with corresponding declines in energy intensity as well as carbon
intensity. Interestingly, energy demand in Nordic urban buildings is
expected to fall to 1990 levels by 2050 even as ﬂoor area increases by
more than 25%.
There are two implicit assumptions within these projections:
integration of eﬃciency with other policy eﬀorts, and that behavioral
change occurs alongside technical improvements. Firstly, the emissions
intensity of buildings falls to zero by about 2045 but this is achievable
only if proper grid infrastructure investments are made (so Nordic
countries can export excess power, oﬀsetting the cost of eﬃciency
upgrades), if bioenergy substitutes fossil fuels for heat, and if new
technologies such as low temperature district heating achieve diﬀusion.
Over the longer term, eﬃciency improvements to buildings come to
depend on improved and integrated urban planning and the dissemi-
nation of energy management systems that empower consumers.
Second, it is these energy management systems that must also
encourage behavioral change. Consumers away from urban areas
and/or centralized district heating networks must come to adopt heat
pumps and solar heating, as well as upgrades to their residential
appliances and building stock. For instance, all traditional incandes-
cent and halogen light bulbs must be completely phased out, and
energy performance standards must be tightened for appliances and
equipment. Consumers in urban areas must also pursue energy
eﬃciency upgrades, especially those that lower peak demand, such as
very-high-performance envelopes, including air sealing, insulation,
highly insulating windows (e.g. triple-pane, low-emissivity windows)
and high- eﬃciency ventilation. Research from behavioral science and
social science suggests that such upgrades and improvements in
eﬃciency will involve signiﬁcant changes in consumer practices at
both the home and workplace (Walker et al., 2014; Sdei et al., 2015;
Kastner and Stern, 2015; Sunikka-Blank and Galvin, 2016; Staddon
et al., 2016).
3.3. Transport
The transport pillar represents one of the more pernicious chal-
Fig. 7. Per capita energy consumption in the Nordic countries and OECD Average, 1970–2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives 2016 (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: GJ=Gigajoules.
OECD=Organization of Cooperation and Development.
Fig. 8. Nordic buildings energy consumption and energy and emissions intensities,
1990, 2013, and 2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic
Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: both panels depict
the “Carbon Neutral Scenario.” PJ = Petajoules. kWh = kilowatt-hour.
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lenges for Nordic decarbonization. Transport currently accounts for
almost 40% of Nordic carbon dioxide emissions, meaning it therefore
holds the potential for greatest emissions reductions. As Fig. 9
indicates, achieving these reductions depends on an almost complete
phase out of conventional gasoline and residual fuel and staggering
reductions in conventional diesel and jet fuel. Conversely, electricity,
biofuel, and hydrogen see considerable growth. As the 2013 version of
the report concluded, “the electriﬁcation of passenger transport [is one
of the] primary building blocks in a low-carbon Nordic transport
system.” Projections suggest that by 2030, 30% of all new passenger
vehicle sales must be full battery electric models, and that number
must rise to 90% by 2050. A nearly complete phase out of conventional
internal combustion engine vehicles needs to occur by 2050.
Underscoring the immensity of the technical challenge is the fact that
compared to 2000, transport’s total energy usage in 2050 is expected to
decrease by more than 20%, yet passenger and freight activity is
expected to increase a whopping 70%.
However, as Fig. 9 also reveals, electriﬁcation does not work for all
transport modes. It expands to account for a majority of personal light
duty vehicle consumption and almost all of rail consumption. Electric
vehicles become especially attractive in urban areas that have shorter
driving distances, more acute air pollution and noise concerns, and
better infrastructure for charging. However, the technology simply has
not progressed to facilitate a transition to electricity for heavy duty
vehicles such as buses, freight trucks, long distance trains, and
airplanes. These modes will most likely continue to operate on jet fuel,
biofuel, diesel, and gasoline – at least over the next few decades. In
2050, buses are expected to rely on a mix of diesel and biofuel; freight
trucks see slightly more penetration of electricity, but that is mostly to
oﬀset idling. Air transport and sea depend on biofuel to meet a majority
of their transport needs—air because liquid fuel still holds a superior
energy density compared to batteries, sea because such fuels can still
work in the large one- and two-stroke diesel engines on most sea
container ships (Smil, 2010), the idea being that it is most cost eﬀective
to substitute the fuel rather than replace the costly engines. This
necessitates continued improvement of biofuel, especially since bio-
fuels are expected to meet nearly two-thirds of total ﬁnal energy
demand for transport in 2050.
To reach these targets, transportation fuels must change, but
policies (a political tolerance for higher costs) and behavioral patterns
must alter as well. For instance, decarbonization of transport through
advanced biofuels produced locally will still be more costly than simply
participating in conventional biofuel markets. Although further re-
search eﬀorts and technological learning are anticipated to facilitate
Nordic biofuel prices declining further, using biomass resources to
cover the entire demand for transport would require diverting them
from higher value industrial products. So Nordic planners and
consumers must tolerate higher costs if they want to source their
biofuel sustainably or prioritize domestic production. Moreover, the
NETP acknowledges that a three-pronged strategy of avoid, shift, and
improve is critical: avoiding transport activity (altering consumer
preferences) in addition to shifting to more eﬃcient and less carbon-
intensive modes and improving transport fuels and infrastructures.
This “avoid” prong depends primarily on inﬂuencing driving habits and
preferences through additional road tolls, parking fees, restrictions on
parking, promoting public transport, and incentivizing cycling and
walking.
One very simpliﬁed way of viewing transport decarbonization is
Fig. 9. Nordic Transportation Modes and Fuel Mixes, 2010–2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: both panels depict the
“Carbon Neutral Scenario.” EJ = Exajoules. PLDVs = Personal Light Duty Vehicles. CNG = Compressed Natural Gas. LPG = Liqueﬁed Petroleum gas.
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that fossil fueled cars are rapidly phased out to accommodate short-
distance transport modes, and replaced with a mix of fuel cells, full
electric cars, plug in hybrids, and hybrids, whereas biofuel expansion
(and imports) are needed to oﬀset long-distance transport modes.
These pathways are depicted in Fig. 10.
3.4. Industry and carbon storage
Industry, IEA and Nordic Energy Research put it succinctly, could
become a “deal breaker” for meeting climate targets. One fundamental
reason is that while fairly radical changes are expected in the other
three sectors of electricity/heat, eﬃciency, and transport, only minor
changes are anticipated for industrial structures and the production of
materials across the Nordic countries. Moreover, given how intimately
industrial production in the Nordic region is tied to jobs and economic
development, planners there acknowledge that industrial activity must
continue unabated even in a low-carbon society. Despite the perception
that the Nordic region relies mostly on a clean, service economy, all
Nordic countries except Denmark are highly dependent on energy
intensive industrial manufacturing and use more energy per unit of
Gross Domestic product than the average across the OECD.
As Table 1 tentatively depicts, given projections connected to
population and economic growth, industrial production is actually
forecast to increase over the next few decades, with paper in
particular maintaining its status as the largest produced commod-
ity across the region, reaching about 26.7 million tons of produc-
tion a year, followed by steel, cement, and aluminum. Crude steel,
cement, and methanol also see double digit increases over the same
period. With substantial production therefore in iron and steel,
cement, chemicals, and aluminum, many industrial process-related
emissions cannot be eliminated through fuel switching or energy
eﬃciency improvements.
Because of this growth in industrial production, carbon capture and
storage (CCS) becomes an instrumental part of facilitating economic
development while also maintaining decarbonization pathways. As
Fig. 10. Nordic vehicle types and demand for transport biofuel, 2010–2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives 2016 (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: both panels depict the
“Carbon Neutral Scenario.” PJ = Petajoules. CNG = Compressed Natural Gas. LPG = Liqueﬁed Petroleum gas. ICE = Internal Combustion Engine.
Table 1
Industrial materials production in Nordic countries.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic
Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: 2050 column depicts
the “Carbon Neutral Scenario.” Mt = Million metric tons.
Material production (Mt) 2013 2050 % growth
Crude steel 8.5 9.9 16.5%
Paper and paperboard 25.7 26.7 3.9%
Cement 7.4 8.3 12.2%
Aluminum 6.9 7.0 1.4%
High-value chemicals 2.3 2.5 8.7%
Ammonia 0.4 0.4 0.0%
Methanol 0.8 0.9 12.5%
Fig. 11. Nordic Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Country, 2010–2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic
Energy Technology Perspectives 2016 (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: Figure depicts the
“Carbon Neutral Scenario.”
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Fig. 11 indicates, the Nordic countries must start capturing and sinking
carbon no later than 2035, and by 2050, they must act as a net sink—
storing and sequestering more carbon than they emit. For these
reasons, International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research
(2013) note that CCS “represents the most important option among
new technologies for reducing industrial CO2 emissions after 2030.
Currently, great uncertainties exist as to how to deploy CCS, and
therefore both CCS demonstrations and closer Nordic collaboration
would be needed to overcome the barriers.” Indeed, the NETP projects
that by 2050, at least 50% of all Nordic cement plants must be fully
utilizing CCS along with 30% of iron, steel, and chemical plants. This
deployment of CCS is presumed to undergird a necessary 60%
reduction in carbon dioxide intensity across industry.
In setting out this industrial trajectory, three additional points
merit elaboration. One is that while CCS is the single most
important option for industrial decarbonization, it is not the only
one expected to be utilized. Energy eﬃciency measures within
industry are expected to reduce ﬁnal industrial energy consumption
by roughly 9% between 2013 and 2050. Process and eﬃciency
improvements such as newer cement kilns, electric arc furnaces for
steel and iron production, feedstock and fuel switching for chemi-
cals and petrochemicals, aggressive paper and pulp recycling, and
aluminum production through inert anodes processes (among
other improvements) are all expected to come online over this
period. A second point is that, given the capital intensity and
processes involved, Nordic industry has a much slower rate of
decarbonization compared to all of the other sectors. A third point
is that by 2050, industry comes to account for almost 50% of all
remaining Nordic carbon dioxide emissions.
4. What challenges exist?: Contingency, contestation and
injustice
To be sure, the Nordic decarbonization pathways articulated above
are not simple nor easy in their own right. But, as this section indicates,
they must confront at least three interconnected challenges spanning
the dimensions of contingency, contestation, and energy justice
summarized by Table 2. The Nordic energy transition is sociotechnical
(Geels, 2004) in that it must involve altering technological infrastruc-
tures alongside political regimes, economic structures, broader global
pressures, and even changing consumer preferences. This makes it
dependent on a number of diﬀuse factors, including further develop-
ment of technology, strong political support, and social acceptance. The
idea with listing these barriers is not to be exhaustive—there are likely
many more—but more illustrative in the scope and types of challenges
faced. What proceeds is admittedly a limited selection of many possible
concerns. Nonetheless, the themes of contingency, contestation, and
justice are meant to both represent some of the most pressing
challenges and also convey new relevant research agendas in the wider
energy studies ﬁeld.
4.1. Technological contingency
The Nordic transition has elements of both historical and future
contingency, a dependence on a set of conditions to materialize.
Historically, most of the Nordic countries have had strong energy
policies in place for many decades, inﬂuenced especially by the oil
shocks of the 1970s. Denmark in particular has promoted wind
electricity, combined heat and power and district heating, and energy
eﬃciency (inclusive of a tax on carbon and revenues funneled back into
energy research) since the 1970s and 1980s (Sovacool, 2013).
Moreover, the Nordic countries were lucky to have so much hydro-
electricity and bioenergy (especially in forests) built out before
sustainability and climate change became more salient topics. So in
this way, the Nordic transition has been historically contingent on a
major global crisis occurring (OPEC embargo) and a degree of
fortuitousness in tapping into low-carbon energy resources before
climate change became a more signiﬁcant global topic in the 1990s.
The Nordic transition is contingent on future technical innovation
across multiple systems as well. It will depend on technological
breakthroughs, but these are not necessarily obvious nor predeter-
mined. In terms of electricity and heat, bioenergy harvesting practices
must improve alongside conversion processes and eﬃciency. Oﬀshore
and onshore wind turbines must become more competitive to the point
where they supply more than 30% of regional Nordic electricity
generation, coupled with advancements in hydroelectricity. Yet oﬀ-
shore wind, apart from higher installation and maintenance costs
(reckoned to be greater for ﬂoating than ﬁxed turbines), runs the risk of
impinging on bird migration routes as was seen in the debate over
Horns Rev in Denmark (McCombie and Jeﬀerson, 2016). Solar
radiation – direct and for much of the year indirect - in the Nordic
countries is, of course, modest (Haukkala, 2015) and the Nordic winter
has the least sun precisely when electricity loads peak. Iceland has
indeed become a world leader in geothermal energy, but it uses a
signiﬁcant amount of this for aluminum smelting with a consequent
increases in sulfur hexaﬂuoride emissions that must be managed
(Krater and Rose, 2009).
In the realm of buildings and eﬃciency, building owners and
occupants must come to adopt (and trust) high quality heat pumps
and solar heating devices, very-high-performance envelopes, and new
techniques such as air sealing, insulation, highly insulating windows
and high- eﬃciency ventilation. However, in some countries such as
Sweden, heat pumps would require extensive strengthening of founda-
tions to protect houses from natural radiation, and the rocky sub-
structure of Norway, Sweden and Iceland could make installation
diﬃcult (Levesque et al., 1997; Mata et al., 2013).
In the domain of transport, hydrogen fuel cells must enhance their
performance but stakeholders remain deeply divided over research
pathways (Andreasen and Sovacool, 2015; Enevoldsen et al., 2014). An
aggressive expansion of advanced biofuel is necessary, but raises
concerns over land use and transport (Fevolden, 2016; Fischer et al.,
Table 2
Sociotechnical challenges facing a Nordic energy transition.
Dimension Challenge Description
Technological Contingency Reliance on continued technical innovations across renewable electricity systems, heat, efficiency, transport, and (most
critically) carbon capture and storage
Dependence on continued global eﬀorts to mitigate and respond to climate change, as well as rising fossil fuel prices and a
common European Union Energy Policy with more strongly integrated grids
Political Contestation Risk of an unstable and unpredictable policy environment
Declining rates of social acceptability for decentralized energy systems and electric transmission lines and cables
A growing intolerance for carbon and energy targets
Social Energy Justice and
Recognition
Loss of jobs in fossil fuel industries, need for retraining
Low levels of energy literacy and understanding about Nordic energy and climate policies
Outsourcing and exportation of fossil fuels as well as embodied emissions associated with renewable energy (and others)
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2010). Substantial investments in electric vehicles and associated
charging infrastructure must occur (Borén et al., 2016; Graabak
et al., 2016). Energy storage systems are needed to integrate electricity,
heat, buildings, and transport sectors together, but remain only at
nascent stages of development (Zaﬁrakis et al., 2016; Beaudin et al.,
2010). Most critically, for industry CCS technologies and techniques
must not only be demonstrated, but then commercially accepted by a
large number of Nordic industrial ﬁrms—a large question mark
(Anthonsen et al., 2016; Lund and Mathiesen, 2012; Teir et al.,
2010; Van Alphen et al., 2009). The Nordic case therefore oﬀers a
counter intuitive example of where political goals may not be achieved
due to lack of technological innovation, rather than the more common
and apparent trend of technological innovation and low-carbon plan-
ning frustrated by a lack of political commitment.
A second contingency is more spatial and refers to broader, “land-
scape” pressures (Geels, 2004) that can alter the desirability or
feasibility of decarbonization pathways, especially grid integration with
Europe. A current case in point would be the premise within the NETP
assumptions that fossil fuel prices continue to rise; yet, as of 2016, oil
prices remain below historic trends. Another landscape assumption is
that the political environment surrounding the Nordic region remains
stable, that is, Germany continues with its Energiewende (Zakeri et al.,
2016), and other members of the European Union continue to push for
a common energy policy that also promotes greater interconnection
between the Nordic Power Pool (Nordpool) and European markets. The
British exit (“Brexit”) from the European Union could erode this
assumption about common policy, particularly if more protectionist
policies come into play across the continent. Another critical facet here
is electric transmission networks and high voltage direct current lines
that better link with continental Europe. As Shaﬁei et al. (2014) warn,
“the highly interconnected regional electricity market is the corner-
stone of the Nordic energy system, and it can serve as a key enabler for
further emission reductions towards 2050.” Tenggren et al. (2016) add
that “if the Nordic power system is to integrate further with the rest of
Europe, there would be a need for more harmonized planning practices
not only between the Nordic countries but also with European
partners.” Moreover, the IEA and Nordic Energy Research (2016)
caution that better integration with European electricity markets could
also push prices upward, leading to a new regime of high and unstable
prices rather than the more traditional low and stable prices that have
been a key advantage for Nordic industry.
4.2. Political contestation
The Nordic transition is also contingent on political outcomes and
stability. Underpinning its decarbonization pathways are strong poli-
cies and policy commitment at not only the regional and national
levels, but within municipalities, communes, and local communities.
Such pathways depend on the assumption that several Nordic subna-
tional actors will continue to adopt climate and energy targets that are
even more aggressive than national goals. They also depend on the
stability and predictability of those targets, what one policy analyst
referred to as the “three Ls” for eﬀective energy policy: loud, long, and
legal: loud in the sense that they oﬀer clear price signals and encourage
public involvement; long in that they are consistent and predictable;
and legal in that they are backed by strong political support and have
penalties for noncompliance (Hamilton, 2009). Change any of these
three policy tenets, and you likely alter the policy outcome..
As a sign of how rapidly political goals can change, consider two
very recent examples. In August 2015, after a change in political
leadership in Denmark, the new Climate Minister Lars Christian
Lilleholt announced plans to scale back the country’s ambitious carbon
reduction goals, arguing that they were too costly for Danish busi-
nesses. “It will be very expensive,” he remarked, “and will therefore
impose extra costs on the business community. This is not what
Denmark needs right now” (quoted in Bagger (2015)). Furthermore,
the NETP presumes that countries such as Sweden will remain
committed to the phase-out of nuclear energy, yet in 2016 the
Swedish government announced plans to build new reactors (Milne,
2016). (As a positive sign, a parliamentary commission ﬁnished in June
2016 stated that Sweden should aim to be have a 100% renewable
energy system by 2045).
A related political obstacle relates to declining rates of social
acceptability for some decentralized energy systems such as wind
energy as well as electric vehicles, cables and transmission lines. For
instance, there is some evidence that Danish perceptions may be
changing and that attitudes could start reﬂecting disaﬀection with
energy and environmental policies. Ladenburg and Dahlgaard (2012)
and Ladenburg (2015) have noted that, paradoxically, in some
instances repeated exposure to wind turbines can diminish acceptance.
Noel and Sovacool (2016) studied the promise of innovative business
models for electric mobility and electric vehicles in the Nordic region
(though a case study of “Better Place”), and found that despite a stated
commitment to green driving, corporate actors had to abandon their
projects for lack of consumer interest. Another recent survey in
Denmark found that many drivers and commuters remain uninformed
or unconcerned about greener transport options (Nielsen et al., 2015).
Klitkou et al. (2015) also caution that the relatively slow diﬀusion of
electric vehicles so far across the region has resulted in an under-
utilization of charging infrastructure, creating a disincentive for further
investment. Communities have come to oppose or at least less
rigorously support plans for new electric power transmission lines
and cables in places such as Norway and Sweden (Aas et al., 2014). Last
but not least we have a potentially growing social and political
intolerance for carbon and energy targets. Klok et al. (2006) found in
an older survey, for instance, that “most participants felt that Denmark
had now paid the price of international environmental and social
leadership long enough, that Denmark could not continue being
superior to the other EU countries (as it was believed Denmark was),
and that it was time other countries now took over some of the burden
of going in the lead.” The nongovernmental group the Council of
Environmental Economics, whose members include trade and labor
unions, employer’s federations, government institutions and nongo-
vernmental organizations, has also consistently proclaimed that strong
energy and climate policies such as environmental taxes hurt house-
holds and businesses (Quoted in Sovacool and Blyth (2015)).
4.3. Energy justice and recognition
A ﬁnal type of obstacle relates to energy justice and recognition,
deﬁned as achieving a global energy system that fairly disseminates
both the beneﬁts and costs of energy services, and one that has
representative and impartial energy decision-making (Sovacool and
Dworkin, 2014, 2015; Sovacool et al., 2016a). In this context, even
though the Nordic low-carbon transition has obvious, tangible beneﬁts,
and will create many “winners,” it also has at least some “losers” and
negative implications from the perspective of energy justice. It may also
not recognize explicitly enough vulnerable groups.
At the top of the list are the obvious job losses associated with the
displacing of coal, natural gas, and oil, and potentially nuclear power (if
the phase-out does indeed occur). Some of these skills and jobs may be
transferable to other sectors, such as oﬀshore oil platform engineers
instead putting their expertise into oﬀshore wind turbine foundations,
but many will not. A related concern is that some of the technologies
being pushed by Nordic climate policies, such solar panels or electric
vehicles, and especially zero energy homes and more expensive electric
appliances or eﬃciency upgrades, tend not to be utilized by the poor or
lower middle class. This could become a pressing equity and aﬀord-
ability concern with how state-of-the-art energy systems are distributed
throughout the region—they could amplify already widening gaps
between the rich and poor, wealthy and non-wealthy, as well as the
power relationship between energy suppliers and users.
B.K. Sovacool Energy Policy 102 (2017) 569–582
578
A secondary concern is possible lack of understanding and public
input into Nordic climate planning. Sovacool and Blyth (2015)
surveyed energy consumers and business leaders in Denmark, and
noted that a strong majority of them had widespread lack of public
knowledge—an inability to properly assess energy challenges or to
grasp energy facts. A possible implication was that the Danish energy
transition was only possible to the extent that its people remained
uninformed about energy and climate issues.
A ﬁnal, far more serious justice concern, acknowledged by the
NETP in a box on embedded emissions, relates to the exporting or
oﬀshoring of Nordic carbon emissions elsewhere. While the Nordic
decarbonization pathways above clearly seek to create a fossil-free
regional economy, and imply that fossil fuels are socially, economically,
and environmentally undesirable, this has not stopped countries such
as Norway from continuing to export them, or promoting fossil fuels
overseas. Two of Norway’s largest enterprises, the Government Pension
Fund Global and Statoil, still continue to invest hundreds of millions of
dollars in hundreds of diﬀerent coal and oil companies (Jorde, 2013).
This will surely oﬀset the carbon gains made by the Nordic countries
themselves, and also place other communities at risk to the external-
ities across the fossil fuel lifecycle. Indeed, the necessity of Nordic
countries meeting their own carbon goals only by exporting fossil fuels
elsewhere is noted explicitly in the NETP. As Fig. 12 reveals, the Nordic
region is an actual net exporter of primary energy based largely on the
trading of oil products, natural gas, and crude feedstocks—exports (by
volume) that more than double the amount of domestic production.
This global oﬀshoring of carbon is not limited to fossil fuels.
Sovacool et al. (2016b) examined the externalities from manufacturing
oﬀshore and onshore wind turbines for use in the Nordic region and
found that wind energy has externalities across its construction and
manufacturing, ones that both oﬀset (in part) their environmental
credentials and also result in signiﬁcant emissions being outsourced to
China and South Korea. Taking into account “environmental proﬁts
and losses,” the study estimated that China and South Korea accounted
for about 80% of embodied emissions and resulting environmental
damages across each type of Nordic turbine.
5. What broader lessons emerge?: Conclusions and policy
implications
Five conclusions are oﬀered for energy analysts as well as planners
and policymakers. First, and positively, is that the Nordic energy
transition conclusively demonstrates the cost eﬃcacy and reliability of
renewable low-carbon energy systems. The Nordic region already
receives a vast share of its electricity generation from low-carbon
sources, and Denmark especially generates almost half of its electricity
from wind. Fig. 13 shows that a mix of low carbon technologies—
energy eﬃciency, bioenergy, hydroelectricity, wind, solar, and CCS—
can expand even more to displace almost 20 million tons of emissions
in the power sector by 2030 and more than 90 million tons by 2050.
Onshore wind power in particular grows exponentially over this period,
expanding fourfold from 24 TWh in 2013 to TWh in 2050, and oﬀshore
wind grows eightfold to 40 TWh. Nuclear generation falls by two-thirds
with all remaining reactors residing only in Finland. From a regional
scale, nuclear power falls from 22% of Nordic electricity generation in
2013 to 6% in 2050.
The NETP also suggests that if a carbon-neutral system is achieved,
it will likely cost less transitioning to a more distributed, integrated,
and ﬂexible system than one dependent on centralized nuclear and
thermoelectric power plants. As Table 3 indicates, the total estimated
cost of the Nordic energy transition is roughly $357 billion, totaling
less than 1% of cumulative GDP over the period—and almost all of
these costs will be oﬀset by fuel savings. Indeed, the IEA and Nordic
Energy (2016: 25–26) estimate that the external costs associated with
the health impacts of air pollution alone in the Nordic countries (about
$9 to $14 billion annually) are roughly equal to the additional
investment needed to achieve a carbon neutral scenario. Put another
way, by displacing pollution the Nordic energy transition pays for itself.
Fig. 13. Low-Carbon Electricity Systems in the Nordic Region, 2030 and 2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016). Note: MT=Million metric tons.
CO2= Carbon Dioxide. PV=Photovoltaic. CCS=Carbon Capture and Storage.
Fig. 12. Nordic exports of primary energy, 2011.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives (2013) (Paris: OECD, 2013). Note: PJ=Petajoule.
NGL=Natural Gas Liquids.
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Second, trade and interconnection with Europe are instrumental to
the Nordic countries reaching their carbon and energy targets. If
average generation costs in continental Europe stay higher than in
the Nordic region, then it becomes a major exporter of 53 TW h of
electricity in 2050. As Fig. 14 illustrates, Nordic electricity trade must
expand considerably—underscoring the need for paralleled, coordi-
nated grid development and interconnections with Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
Additionally, by 2050, 16% of total Nordic biomass demand across
all sectors (especially transport, where biofuel needs to substitute for
oil) will need to be met by imports, including for refueling at Nordic
ports. International cooperation is also needed through international
pricing of carbon and common principles with Europe concerning
energy performance auditing mechanisms. This ampliﬁes the extra-
territorial dimensions of the Nordic transition.
Third, while driven signiﬁcantly by national policies and regional
governance principles, it is actually subnational actors that serve to
drive most of the four decarbonization pathways across electricity and
heat, eﬃciency, transport, and industry. Cities and municipalities take
the lead as actors, especially given that urbanization rates across the
Nordic region are expected to occur at double the rate of previous
decades. It is cities that will need to invest in new buildings, sponsor
retroﬁts, erect electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and optimize
heat networks. Nordic capital cities are already roughly 30% more
eﬃcient than the average for buildings and 40% more eﬃcient for
transport, due to economies of scale, infrastructural availability, and
greater population density. It is also cities that are uniquely advanced
and progressive in terms of energy systems integration, with well-
established heating and cooling networks and many within close
proximity of medium sized power plants.
Fourth, the Nordic case emphasizes that energy transitions take
generations. Even for a group of relatively wealthy, small, and
committed countries, the transition will take at least three to four
more decades. Its success rests upon a number of compelling techno-
logical contingences or breakthroughs, each of them will require time—
to name a few, a continued phase out of nuclear power; a rapid
ramping up of onshore and oﬀshore wind energy; a spectacular
diﬀusion of electric vehicles; a massive increase in bioenergy produc-
Fig. 14. Nordic Electricity Trade in 2015 (left) and 2050 (right).
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic Energy Technology Perspectives 2016 (Paris: OECD, 2016). Assumes the Carbon Neutral
Scenario.
Table 3
Cumulative Nordic Investments for Decarbonization by Sector, 2016–2050.
Source: Modiﬁed from International Energy Agency and Nordic Energy Research, Nordic
Energy Technology Perspectives (2016) (Paris: OECD, 2016). Assumes the Carbon
Neutral Scenario.
Sector $ (USD Million)
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tion; and the commercialization of industrial scale carbon capture and
storage. On top of this, households and consumers must learn to adopt
better energy management systems and industrial planners must come
to adopt newer cement kilns, electric arc furnaces, and feedstock
switching for chemicals, petrochemicals, and paper and pulping.
Fifth, and lastly, however, is that the Nordic transition, for all of its
promise, remains contingent, contested, and potentially unjust. As one
constraining factor, there are elements of the Nordic transition unique
to its own sociotechnical environment—countries endowed with plenti-
ful fossil fuels that they can export to generate revenue they funnel back
into domestic decarbonization, coupled with a history of strong energy
and climate planning and high fuel and electricity prices. The Nordic
blueprint, moreover, will most certainly not be adopted globally,
especially in places like the United States with its poisonous partisan
politics (Hess et al., 2016), China and its scramble for energy resources
of all shapes and sizes (Green and Kryman, 2014), and India with its
focus on expanding access to energy regardless of its source (Palit et al.,
2013). Then we have some very real justice and recognition concerns
including those set to lose their jobs as fossil fuels are displaced, a lack
of understanding among some citizens about energy and climate topics,
and the outsourcing of embodied carbon emissions overseas. In sum,
even the history and the future of Nordic decarbonization—perhaps the
exemplar for the world—reminds us that energy transitions are more
technologically contingent, contextually speciﬁc, and politically con-
tested processes than perhaps we would like to believe.
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